Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0234

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 18, 1975
(SALT TWO-679)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 18, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 18, 1975

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF CARRYING OVER CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, WHICH DEALS WITH VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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I

IN THE COURSE OF WORKING OUT AGREED FORMULATIONS FOR THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE DELEGATIONS FACE THE NEED CONSTANTLY TO REFER TO THE CONTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. AND THIS IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE, FOR IN ALL THEIR WORK THE SIDES ARE TO BE INVARIABLY GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THAT UNDERSTANDING; THERE IS A DIRECT INSTRUCTION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE VERY TEXT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY SAID IN ITS STATEMENTS, AND THE U.S. SIDE HAS EXPRESSED AGREEMENT, THAT, BEING THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE REQUIRES THAT IT BE APPROACHED IN A SCRUPULOUSLY STRICT AND PRECISE MANNER. THAT DOCUMENT REPRESENTS THE TOTALITY OF THE PROVISIONS WHICH PRECISELY IN THEIR ENTIRETY, WITH RESPECT TO THE SCOPE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, EMBODY THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THEREFORE, TO ATTEMPT ALTERING OR RETOUCHING IN ANY WAY THE FORMULATIONS CONTAINED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WOULD MEAN TO DEPART FROM THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THAT AGREED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.

IN ITS STATEMENT OF JULY 15, 1975 THE U.S. DELEGATION EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT, IN THE VIEW OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE IS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS REQUIRING THAT THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS NEED BE TRANSFERRED VERBATIM FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT WAS ARGUED THAT ALLEGEDLY THE FORMULATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE PERMIT "AMBIGUITIES" AND "MISUNDERSTANDINGS," AND THAT CERTAIN PROPOSALS OF THE U.S. SIDE ARE DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THESE IMPRECISIONS. SUCH AN APPROACH WAS PRESENTED AS A SORT OF METHODOLOGY WHICH ALLEGEDLY MUST BE ADHERED TO IN WORKING OUT THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

I WILL SAY MOST EMPHATICALLY: THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AGREE WITH SUCH A MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH IN PRACTICE IS AIMED AT CHANGING THE UNDERSTANDING ALREADY REACHED.

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TURNING TO THE TEXT OF THAT DOCUMENT, THE PROVISIONS OF WHICH ARE TO GUIDE THE DELEGATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT CONTAINS A COMPLETELY PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ARTICLES I AND II AND THE AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, SHALL BE A PART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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AS FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE WHICH ACCORDING TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, THEIR PRECISION AND CLARITY HAVE BEEN VERIFIED IN PRACTICE DURING THE MORE THAN THREE-YEAR PERIOD OF TIME SINCE THEY WERE SIGNED.

THE TASK OF THE DELEGATIONS CONSISTS NOT IN SOMEHOW RETOUCHING THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, BUT IN SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERING TO ITS PROVISIONS AND IN STRIVING TO EMBODY THEM ADEQUATELY IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. ONLY GIVEN SUCH AN APPROACH, CAN THE TASK WE HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH BE ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY AND A DRAFT BE PREPARED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES. NOR ARE THERE ANY GROUNDS FOR ANY KIND OF CHANGES IN THE WORDING OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES I AND II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHEN INCLUDING THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, IN THE DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

THIS APPLIES TO THE QUESTION OF CARRYING OVER ARTICLES I AND II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS. AS ALREADY EMPHASIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE MEETING ON APRIL 29, 1975, THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON THIS SCORE IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING WHICH PROVIDES FOR RETENTION FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AND CONVERSELY, THE WORDING CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE IV, PAR. 3, IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REGARDING RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION, WHICH IS RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

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II

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED ITS CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING VERIFICATION BY THE SIDES OF COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, BY USE OF THEIR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THE PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION ARE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE XVII OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975. PARS. 1 AND 2 OF THAT ARTICLE HAVE BEEN FULLY AGREED, BUT WITH REFERENCE TO PAR. 3 CERTAIN DIFFERENCES REMAIN.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE U.S. VERSION OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, AS WELL AS FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION OF JULY 9, 1975, THAT IN ADDITION TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES

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NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES THAT AN OBLIGATION ALSO BE ASSUMED "NOT TO EMPLOY PRACTICES" WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE TO BEGIN WITH THAT THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT REPORDUCES IN FULL THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XII OF THE ABM TREATY AND ARTICLE V OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH DEAL WITH VERIFICATION. DURING THE OPERATION OF THIS TREATY AND AGREEMENT, THE SOLUTIONS FOUND FOR VERIFICATION ISSUES, WHICH SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, HAVE PASSED THE TEST OF PRACTICE AND PROVED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

A COMPARISON OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT WITH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES NOT INDICATE ANYTHING THAT WOULD REQUIRE CHANGING OR AMENDING ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975, AS COMPARED TO ARTICLE XII, PAR. 3, OF THE ABM TREATY OF ARTICLE V, PAR. 3, OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. STATEMENTS

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0234

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CONCERNING THE NEED OF AIDING TO THE VERIFICATION ARTICLE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, AS COMPARED TO THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY REFERENCES TO THE ALLEGEDLY GREATER COMPLEXITY OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE BY THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, THE ABM TREATY ALSO CONTAINS A NUMBER OF OBLIGATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF RATHER COMPLEX QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS. NEVERTHELESS, ARTICLE XII OF THE ABM TREATY, WHICH DEALS WITH VERIFICATION MEASURES, DOES NOT CONTAIN LIMITATIONS ON "PRACTICES," OR ON "TESTING PRACTICES".

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE PROVISIONS ON A MUTUAL OBLIGATION NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, WHICH IS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 3, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES, APPLIES TO ALL THE RELEVANT TYPES OF ACTIVITY COVERED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. ATTEMPTS ON THE U.S. SIDE TO LIST THE PRACTICES WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS DELIBERATELY IMPENDING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL

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TECHNICAL MEANS, HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE UNFOUNDED. TO INTRODUCE LIMITATIONS ON PRACTICES WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ONE SIDE TO INTRODUCE INTO THE INTERNAL TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE OTHER SIDE; THIS WOULD BE COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

TO CONTINUE . THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE--- AND IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 3--THAT THE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES DOES NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES. THE U.S. VERSION OF PAR.3 OF THIS ARTICLE ALSO DEALS WITH PRACTICES, HOWEVER NOT WITH CURRENT PRACTICES, BUT THOSE IN USE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR.3, IS BASED ON WEIGHTY CONSIDERATIONS.

HOW CAN ONE SPEAK OF PRACTICES IN USE PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, I.E. SEVERAL YEARS AGO, WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS, WILL INCLUDE LIMITATIONS ON SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS AS HEAVY BOMBERS, AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH ARANGE OF MORE THEN 600KILOMETERS, AND ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, LIMITATIONS NOT PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT? IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL IS SIMPLY UNREALISTIC.

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AND CONVERSELY, "CURRENT PRACTICES" ARE SUFFICIENTLY WELL-KNOW TO BOTH SIDES THANKS TO THEIR USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THESE PRACTICES DO NOT CAUSE THE SIDES TO HAVE ANY DOUBTS CONCERNING THE NON-USE OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. AFTER ALL, THE VERY FACT OF USING DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR WITH RESPECT TO THE AFORMENTIONED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME, WOULD BE COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE OBLIGATIONS THE SIDES HAVE ASSUMED ON THIS SCORE. THEREFORE, THE CONCEPT OF "CURRENT PRACTICES," PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, IS FULLY JUSTIFIED AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY PRECISE.

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NOW FOR THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES." AT THE JULY 9, 1975 MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATIONS, SPEAKING OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AND NOT TO USE PRACTICES IMPEDING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ALSO STATED THAT SUCH MEASURES AND PRACTICES INCLUDE TESTING PRACTICES AMONG OTHERS.

SUCH A PROPOSAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED WELL-FOUNDED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO PREDETERMINE TESTING PRACTICES. IT IS MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT TESTING PRACTICES DEPEND UPON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECT BEING TESTED, AND THAT THESE PRACTICES MAY CHANGE FOR BETTER IDENTIFICATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TEST OBJECT. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO SUCH "TESTING PRACTICES" AS COULD BE ESTABLISHED ONCE AND FOR ALL, WHILE OTHER PRACTICES WOULD BE REGARDED AS "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES" OR AS PRACTICES IMPEDING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS WOULD LIMIT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TESTING OBJECTS BEING MODERNIZED, AND WOULD THEREBY CONFLICT WITH THE AGREED PROVISION CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF THE SIDES TO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED.

IT IS ALL THE MORE UNJUSTIFIED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF TESTING PRACTICES IN USE SEVERAL YEARS AGO WITH RESPECT TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS BEING LIMITED FOR THE FIRST TIME UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. AFTER ALL, IT IS NO SECRET THAT TESTING OF SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEGAN LATER.

BY WAY OF GENERAL CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE U.S. DELEGATIONS, REFLECTED IN THE U.S. WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 3, EXCEPTING, OF COURSE, THE AGREED FORMULATIONS CONTAINED IN THAT PARAGRAPH, AS WELL AS THE CLARIFICATIONS MENTIONED HERE WHICH WERE CONTAINED IN THE JULY 9, 1975 STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, ARE UNFOUNDED.

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THE SOVIET SIDE REAFFIRMS THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII,
PAR. 3, AS BEING CONSISTENT WIHT THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS
OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED.

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